23 Legal Defenses to Foreclosure

How to beat the bank at foreclosure

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    People to Sue

    The following are parties involved can all be sued in a foreclosure action by you (third party claim), if claims against these parties can be identified:
    • Original Lender
    • Originator (Mortgage Broker). Almost every state requires mortgage brokers maintain a surety bond for the benefit of consumers. Check your state law, as you may be able to collect against this bond even if the broker is out of business.
    • Real Estate Broker.
    • Appraiser.
    • Closing Agent.
    • Servicer.
    • Seller.
    • Building contractor.
    • Seller’s attorney.
    • Home inspector.
    • Underwriter of the loan as a security.
    • Holder of the mortgage or note.
    • The trustee for the securitized debt.
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    Lender Complaint

    Filing a Complaint with a Regulatory Agency.

    If you desire to lodge a complaint with a federal regulatory agency, the following information is provided directly by the FDIC:
    Complaint Filing Process

    The agency will usually acknowledge receipt of a complaint letter within a few days. If the letter is referred to another agency, the consumer will be advised of this fact.

    When the appropriate agency investigates the complaint the financial institution may be given a copy of the complaint letter.

      The complaint should be submitted in writing and should include the following:

    Complainant's name, address, telephone number;

    The institution's name and address;

    Type of account involved in the complaint--checking, savings, or loan--and account numbers, if applicable;

    Description of the complaint, including specific dates and the institution's actions (copies of pertinent information or correspondence are also helpful);

    Date of contact and the names of individuals contacted at the institution with their responses;

    Complainant's signature and the date the complaint is being submitted to the regulatory agency.  
    The regulatory agencies will be able to help resolve the complaint if the financial institution has violated a banking law or regulation.

    They may not be able to help where the consumer is not satisfied with an institution’s policy, even though no law or regulation was violated. Additionally, the regulatory agencies do not resolve factual or most contractual disputes.

      The following information will help in determining which agency to contact.

    National Bank
    The Word "National" appears in the bank's name, or the initials N.A. appear after the bank's name. Agency to Contact: Comptroller of the Currency.

    State-Chartered Bank, Member of the Federal Reserve System
    Two signs will be prominently displayed on the door of the bank or in the lobby. One will say "Member, Federal Reserve System." The other will indicate deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and/or "Deposits Federally Insured to $100,000--Backed by the Full Faith and Credit of the United States Government." The word "National" does not appear in the name; the initials N.A. do not appear after the name. Agency to Contact: Federal Reserve Board for federal laws; State Banking Department for state laws.

    State Non-Member Bank or State-Chartered Savings Bank, Federally Insured
    A sign will be prominently displayed at each teller station that indicates that deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and/or "Deposits Federally Insured to $100,000--Backed by the Full Faith and Credit of the United States Government." There will not be a sign saying "Member, Federal Reserve System." The word "National" or the initials N.A. will not appear in the name. Agency to Contact: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for federal laws; State Banking Department for state laws.

    Federal Savings and Loan Association or Federal Savings Association, Federally Insured
    Generally, the work "Federal" appears in the name of the savings and loan association or its name includes initials such as "FA" which indicate its status as a federal savings and loan association. A sign will be prominently displayed at each teller station that says "Deposits Federally Insured to $100,000--Backed by the Full Faith and Credit of the United States Government." Agency to Contact: Office of Thrift Supervision.

    Federal Savings Bank, Federally Insured
    Generally, the work "Federal" appears in the name of the savings bank or its name includes the initials such as "FSB" which indicate its status as a federal savings bank. A sign will prominently displayed at each teller station that says "Deposits Insured to $100,000--Backed by the Full Faith and Credit of the United States Government." Agency to Contact: Office of Thrift Supervision.

    State-Chartered Federally Insured Savings Institution
    There will be a sign prominently displayed at each teller station that says "Deposits Federally Insured to $100,000--Backed by the Full Faith and Credit of the United States Government." Agency to Contact: Office of Thrift Supervision.

    State Chartered Banks or Savings Institutions without Federal Deposit Insurance
    Institution has none of the above described characteristics. Agency to Contact: State Banking Department for state laws; Federal Trade Commission for federal laws.

    Federally Chartered Credit Union
    The term "Federal credit union" appears in the name of the credit union. Agency to Contact: National Credit Union Administration.

    State-Chartered, Federally Insured Credit Union
    A sign will be displayed by stations or windows where deposits are accepted indicating that deposits are insured by NCUA. The term "Federal credit union" does not appear in the name. Agency to Contact: State Agency that regulates credit unions or Federal Trade Commission.

    State-Chartered Credit Unions without Federal Insurance
    The term "Federal credit union" does not appear in the name. Agency to Contact: State Agency that regulates credit unions or Federal Trade Commission.

    Other
    Institutions have none of the characteristics described. Agency to Contact: Appropriate State. Agency for state laws; Federal Trade Commission for federal laws.


     
    COMPLAINTS

    Complaints should be mailed to the appropriate agency with copies of all relevant documents. Original documents or currency should not be sent. Addresses for the federal agencies are:

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
    Division of Consumer and Community Affairs
    20th & Constitution Avenue, NW
    Washington, DC 20551

    Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
    Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection
    550 Seventeenth Street, NW
    Washington, DC 20429

    Office of Thrift Supervision
    Consumer Affairs Office
    1700 G Street, NW
    Washington, DC 20552

    National Credit Union Administration
    Office of Public and Congressional Affairs
    1775 Duke Street
    Alexandria, Virginia 22314-3428

    Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
    Customer Assistance Group
    1301 McKinney Street
    Suite 3710
    Houston, TX 77010

    Federal Trade Commission
    Bureau of Consumer Protection
    Office of Credit
    Washington, DC 20580



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    OCC Advisory Letter on Predatory Lending.

    This powerful letter written by the federal government cautions lenders to avoid predatory mortgage brokers or face serious liability. It is included as Appendix P in 23 Legal Defenses to Foreclosure.

    OCC Advisory Letter AL 2003-2

    Comptroller of the Currency
    Administrator of National Banks

    SUBJECT: Guidelines for National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices

    TO: Chief Executive Officers of All National Banks and National Bank Operating Subsidiaries, Department and Division Heads, and All Examining Personnel


    INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

    The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has received inquiries as to whether state laws and local initiatives addressing certain types of abusive lending can apply to national banks under the principles of federal preemption that have been articulated by the federal courts. Inquiries have also been made about the standards of conduct that the OCC expects national banks to observe in this area.

    Because these inquiries raise issues of broad public interest, the OCC believes it appropriate to set forth in this advisory letter supervisory guidance concerning lending practices that have been criticized as “predatory” or “abusive.” Such practices are inconsistent with important national objectives, including the goals of fair access to credit, community development, and stable homeownership by the broadest spectrum of America. Any lending practices that take unfair advantage of borrowers, or that have a detrimental impact on communities, also conflict with the high standards expected of national banks.

    Many abusive lending practices are already unlawful under existing federal laws and regulations. But even where the particular attributes of a loan are not subject to a specific prohibition, loans reflecting abusive practices nevertheless can involve unfair and deceptive conduct and present significant safety and soundness, reputation, and other risks to national banks.

    Although the OCC does not have reason to believe that national banks or their operating subsidiaries (collectively referred to herein as “national banks”) generally are engaged in predatory lending practices, it expects that national banks will take appropriate steps to ensure that they do not become involved in predatory lending.

    This guidance provides examples of practices that may be abusive, and provides advice on how national banks should avoid engaging in such practices.

    The advisory also describes how certain abusive lending can involve unfair or deceptive practices and thus violate section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (F.T.C. Act). The OCC will review credible evidence that a national bank has engaged in abusive lending practices and, where such practices are found to violate an applicable law or safety and soundness standards, will take appropriate supervisory action.

    BACKGROUND

    The terms “abusive lending” or “predatory lending” are most frequently defined by reference to a variety of lending practices. Although it is generally necessary to consider the totality of the circumstances to assess whether a loan is predatory, a fundamental characteristic of predatory lending is the aggressive marketing of credit to prospective borrowers who simply cannot afford the credit on the terms being offered. Typically, such credit is underwritten predominantly on the basis of the liquidation value of the collateral, without regard to the borrower’s ability to service and repay the loan according to its terms absent resorting to that collateral. This abusive practice leads to “equity stripping.” When a loan has been made based on the foreclosure value of the collateral, rather than on a determination that the borrower has the capacity to make the scheduled payments under the terms of the loan, based on the borrower’s current and expected income, current obligations, employment status, and other relevant financial resources, the lender is effectively counting on its ability to seize the borrower’s equity in the collateral to satisfy the obligation and to recover the typically high fees associated with such credit. Not surprisingly, such credits experience foreclosure rates higher than the norm.

    While such disregard of basic principles of loan underwriting lies at the heart of predatory lending, a variety of other practices may also accompany the marketing of such credit:

    Loan “flipping” – frequent refinancings that result in little or no economic benefit to the borrower and are undertaken with the primary or sole objective of generating additional loan fees, prepayment penalties, and fees from the financing of credit-related products;

    Refinancings of special subsidized mortgages that result in the loss of beneficial loan terms;

    “Packing” of excessive and sometimes “hidden” fees in the amount financed;

    Using loan terms or structures – such as negative amortization – to make it more difficult or impossible for borrowers to reduce or repay their indebtedness;

    Using balloon payments to conceal the true burden of the financing and to force borrowers into costly refinancing transactions or foreclosures;

    Targeting inappropriate or excessively expensive credit products to older borrowers, to persons who are not financially sophisticated or who may be otherwise vulnerable to abusive practices, and to persons who could qualify for mainstream credit products and terms;

    Inadequate disclosure of the true costs, risks and, where necessary, appropriateness to the borrower of loan transactions;

    The offering of single premium credit life insurance; and

    The use of mandatory arbitration clauses.

    LEGAL AND SUPERVISORY RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH ABUSIVE LENDING PRACTICES

    Safety and Soundness Concerns

    As noted above, a departure from fundamental principles of loan underwriting generally forms the basis of abusive lending: lending without a determination that a borrower can reasonably be expected to repay the loan from resources other than the collateral securing the loan, and relying instead on the foreclosure value of the borrower’s collateral to recover principal, interest, and fees. A national bank that makes a loan to a consumer based predominantly on the liquidation value of the borrower’s collateral, rather than on a determination of the borrower’s repayment ability, including current and expected income, current obligations, employment status, and other relevant financial resources, is engaging in a fundamentally unsafe and unsound banking practice that is inconsistent with established lending standards. This practice not only increases the risk to the bank that the loan will default but may also increase the bank’s potential loss exposure upon default.

    Safety and soundness concerns can also arise when a bank’s lending practices effectively foreclose access to a secondary market. Major government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) active in the secondary market for mortgage loans have taken a number of affirmative steps to reduce the possibility that they will purchase abusive loans. These steps include a refusal to purchase mortgage loans:

    In which the lender has not adequately determined the borrower’s ability to repay the debt;

    Subject to the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA);

    With points and fees in excess of 5 percent of the loan amount, except in cases where a higher amount of fees was justified to prevent the loan from being unprofitable; and

    In which a prepaid single premium credit insurance policy was included in the amount financed.

    These GSEs also restrict the use of prepayment penalties. In addition, these entities require monthly borrower payments on loans they have purchased to be reported to the major credit-reporting bureaus. National banks and their operating subsidiaries whose business practices are inconsistent with these guidelines, therefore, run the risk of losing an important source of funding for their operations, and of thereby exposing themselves to greater default risk and risk of loss.

    Violations of the F.T.C. Act

    National banks are subject to section 5 of the F.T.C. Act, which makes unlawful “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” in commerce. The OCC has the authority to enforce section 5 with respect to national banks and to impose sanctions for violations in individual cases. Such practices as loan flipping, equity stripping, and the refinancing of special subsidized mortgage loans may be indicative of unfair or deceptive practices that violate section 5 of the F.T.C. Act. The OCC believes that application of the standards of section 5 and use of the OCC’s authority to enforce compliance with those standards in individual cases is a particularly appropriate approach to ensure that abusive lending practices are not occurring in the national banking system.

    While such determinations are inherently fact-specific, the OCC has issued detailed guidance on the standards it will generally employ in determining whether an act or practice is unfair or deceptive under the F.T.C. Act. Practices may be found to be deceptive and, therefore, unlawful under section 5 of the F.T.C. Act if each of the following factors are present:

    First, there is a representation, omission, act, or practice that is likely to mislead;

    Second, the act or practice would be likely to mislead a reasonable consumer (a reasonable member of the group targeted by the acts or practices in question); and

    Third, the representation, omission, act, or practice is likely to mislead in a material way.

    A practice may be found to be unfair and, therefore, unlawful under section 5 of the F.T.C. Act if each of the following factors are present:

    First, the practice causes substantial consumer injury, such as monetary harm;

    Second, the injury is not outweighed by benefits to the consumer or to competition; and

    Third, the injury caused by the practice is one that consumers could not reasonably have avoided.

    Loan “Flipping” and the Refinancing of Special Subsidized Mortgages as Unfair or Deceptive Practices Under the F.T.C. Act

    Loan “flipping” is generally understood to mean the repeated refinancing of a loan under circumstances that result in little or no economic benefit to the borrower, with the objective of generating additional loan points, loan fees, prepayment penalties, and fees from financing the sale of credit-related products. In addition, the practice is frequently targeted to consumers with limited financial options. Ascertaining whether a lender has engaged in loan “flipping” is a highly fact-specific determination, but the practice generally involves sequential refinancing transactions where, among other things, there is little or no economic benefit to the borrower. Therefore, “flipping” should be thought of as a limited, discrete subset of refinancing transactions. Depending upon the totality of the circumstances, loan flipping may be an unfair or deceptive practice in violation of the F.T.C. Act. The OCC will take supervisory action as appropriate to address such violations.

    For example, loan flipping may constitute an unfair practice under the F.T.C. Act. The practice can result in substantial borrower injury resulting from the substantial fees imposed and from the fact that the transaction may increase debt burdens, decrease home equity, enhance the likelihood of foreclosure, and adversely affect the borrower’s credit history. In addition, loan flipping fails to generate benefits to the consumer that would outweigh this harm. The benefits to competition from this practice – such as lower consumer costs – also seem to be lacking. The harm from loan flipping also may not be “reasonably avoidable,” for example, if the costs, terms, and risks have not been described in a way that the consumer can reasonably be expected to understand and be able to act upon. As a general matter, many terms or practices associated with loan flipping carry risks that the borrower cannot reasonably be expected to appreciate in the absence of clear and understandable explanatory information.

    Even a single refinancing transaction can be abusive and unfair or deceptive, such as in cases involving the refinancing of a special subsidized mortgage. These mortgages, often originated under programs sponsored by governmental or nonprofit organizations, generally contain below-market interest rates or other nonstandard terms beneficial to the borrower. The refinancing of such loans generally entails the loss of one or more of the beneficial loan terms, and thus, carries a particularly high risk of being detrimental to the borrower.

    “Equity Stripping” as an Unfair or Deceptive Practice Under the F.T.C. Act

    “Equity stripping” is identified as a predatory lending practice because it is associated with significant harm to consumers, including an increase in debt burdens and the loss of home equity with little or no compensating benefit to the borrower. Home equity stripping typically involves making loans with excessively high, up-front fees that are financed and secured by the borrower’s home, often with an excessively high penalty upon prepayment of the loan, for the sole or primary objective of stripping the borrower’s home equity. It can also result from loan flipping, and from the practice of making a loan predominantly on the basis of the liquidation value of the collateral, without regard to the borrower’s ability to service and repay the loan according to its terms absent resort to that collateral. Whether a bank has engaged in “equity stripping” also is a highly fact-specific determination involving a finding of consumer abuse. It is to be distinguished from transactions in which home equity decreases may be an integral part of an informed consumer’s purpose for entering into the transaction. Depending upon the totality of the circumstances, equity stripping may be an unfair or deceptive practice in violation of the F.T.C. Act. The OCC will take supervisory action as appropriate to address such violations involving equity stripping.

    For example, equity stripping may constitute an unfair practice under the F.T.C. Act. Equity-stripping practices will almost always involve substantial consumer injury. Such practices decrease the borrower’s wealth, either immediately or over time, and can cause the borrower to lose his or her home. In addition, equity stripping will almost always fail to generate benefits to the consumer or to competition that would outweigh these substantial consumer harms. As with loan flipping, whether the practice was reasonably avoidable by a consumer would depend on the specific facts and circumstances of the transaction and entail a review of the adequacy of information provided to the consumer. This review would include an examination of whether and how the borrower was informed about particular terms or practices associated with equity stripping that carry risks the borrower cannot reasonably be expected to appreciate in the absence of clear and understandable explanatory information. Without adequate information about the effect of these terms and practices, a borrower may not be reasonably able to avoid the injury that may ensue from them.

    Violations of Other Applicable Laws

    Predatory lending practices also may violate other laws, such as HOEPA, which covers certain high-cost mortgage loans. Among other things, HOEPA prohibits negative amortization, increases in the interest rate upon default, and balloon payments for covered loans with a term of less than five years. It also restricts the use of prepayment penalties and due-on-demand clauses in covered loans. HOEPA also prohibits the refinancing of a covered loan to another covered loan in the first year of the loan, unless the refinancing is in the borrower’s interest. In addition, HOEPA prohibits lenders from engaging in a pattern or practice of making covered loans based on the borrower’s collateral without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay, including the borrower’s current and expected income, current obligations, and employment.

    Moreover, certain predatory lending practices involve unlawful discrimination. If a national bank engages in the practice of “steering” a borrower to a loan with higher costs rather than to a comparable loan offered by the bank with lower costs for which the borrower could qualify, and does this on the basis of the borrower’s race, national origin, age, or gender, for example, the OCC will take appropriate enforcement action under the federal fair lending laws.

    Impact of Certain Abusive Lending Practices on CRA Evaluations and Ratings

    Because Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) performance must be considered in connection with various applications for deposit facilities, including branch applications and bank merger transactions, predatory lending also may impede a bank’s strategic plans to expand its operations or to combine with another organization. Under the CRA regulations, abusive lending practices that violate the federal fair lending laws, the F.T.C. Act, or HOEPA, or that evidence other illegal credit practices, adversely affect an institution’s CRA performance. When such conduct comes to the attention of the OCC, it will be taken into account in the OCC’s evaluation of the bank’s CRA performance.

    Furthermore, a national bank that engages in a pattern or practice of extending credit based predominantly on the liquidation value of the collateral, or otherwise without regard to the borrower’s ability to service and repay the loan — in addition to violating HOEPA in some circumstances — is not helping to meet the credit needs of the community consistent with safe and sound operations, and has acted contrary to the OCC’s safety and soundness regulatory guidelines. Such an activity or practice also may adversely affect the OCC’s evaluation of the bank’s CRA performance.

    RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AVOIDING PREDATORY AND ABUSIVE LENDING PRACTICES

    In order to safeguard the interests of the bank and its customers, national banks are advised to have policies and procedures in place to prevent the bank and any of its subsidiaries from engaging in practices that might be considered predatory or abusive. Such policies and procedures should be fashioned to ensure that the bank’s lending complies with applicable safety and soundness standards and consumer protection laws.

    Establishment of Policies and Procedures

    Underwriting policies

    As noted above, when a loan has been made based on the foreclosure value of the collateral rather than on a determination that the borrower has the capacity to service and repay the loan without resort to the collateral, the lender is effectively counting on its ability to seize the borrower’s collateral and use the borrower’s equity in the collateral to satisfy the obligation, and is thus engaging in an unsafe and unsound banking practice.

    National banks are advised to adopt policies and procedures to ensure that an appropriate determination has been made that the borrower has the capacity to make scheduled payments to service and repay the loan, including principal, interest, insurance, and taxes, based on a consideration of the borrower’s:

    Current and expected income;
    Other relevant financial resources;
    Employment status; and
    Financial obligations, including other indebtedness.

    Such policies also should address debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios, as necessary to mitigate the risk of lending without regard to ability to repay.

    Policies addressing risk of abusive practices

    National banks should also consider articulating clear policies and procedures to specify, if applicable, whether and under what circumstances the bank will make loans involving features or circumstances that have been associated with abusive lending practices, including the following:

    Frequent, sequential refinancings;
    Refinancings of special subsidized mortgages that contain terms favorable to the borrower;
    Single-premium credit life insurance or similar products;
    Negative amortization;
    Balloon payments in short-term transactions;
    Prepayment penalties that are not limited to the early years of a loan;
    Financing points, fees, penalties, and other charges;
    Interest rate increases upon default;
    Mandatory arbitration clauses; and
    Making loans subject to HOEPA.

    As noted above, transactions involving these features may be appropriate in many circumstances and may contribute to legitimate business objectives. However, to avoid the risk that a transaction could be deemed to involve unfair or deceptive practices, a primary objective of such policies and procedures should be to prevent customer misunderstanding of the terms and relative costs, risks, and benefits of their loan transaction. Borrowers should be provided with the information that is sufficient to draw the borrower’s attention to these key terms, and to enable them to determine whether the loan meets their particular financial circumstances and needs. National banks also should have policies to help ensure that interest rates and other pricing terms for their loans reasonably reflect the costs and risks of making such loans and are consistent with OCC regulations. Furthermore, to promote credit access where borrowers demonstrate a good record of performance in handling credit, national banks are encouraged to adopt policies and procedures that provide for reporting of good credit histories to the major credit reporting bureaus.

    Policies concerning appropriateness of certain transactions

    In addition, as noted above, some practices may be unfair or deceptive, and abusive, depending upon the consumers that are affected or that are the target audience. Therefore, bank policies may need to specifically address such circumstances. The bank may face significant risks when it offers to borrowers who are elderly, vulnerable, or not financially sophisticated, loan products that contain features that have been associated with abusive lending. Thus, banks are advised to adopt policies and procedures that ensure that lending practices reflect the degree of care that is appropriate to the risk, considering such factors as:

    The sophistication or expertise of the borrower in credit transactions, if known or apparent;
    The need for, and proposed use of, the loan proceeds, if known or stated;
    The borrower’s understanding of how the loan meets the borrower’s particular financial circumstances and needs; and
    The bank’s assessment of the terms and conditions of the loan relative to those needs.

    Loan Quality Control Reviews and Corrective Action

    As a general matter, banks should periodically perform a documentation review on a random sampling of transactions to ensure that transactions comply with bank policies and legal requirements. In addition, in appropriate circumstances, such as when a particular risk has been identified, banks should conduct a more comprehensive review. For example, documentation reviews may indicate problems involving potential fraud or abuse such as significant and unexplained variations between the preliminary disclosures required to be provided to customers under the Truth-in-Lending Act or the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act and the final charges appearing on closing documents; fees that appear to be duplicative or unearned; or evidence of materially misleading statements or omissions with respect to the costs, benefits, risks, and burdens of the transaction. In such circumstances, the bank should take all steps appropriate, including corrective action, to address the deficiencies and to address any borrower injury.

    CONCLUSION

    The OCC encourages national banks to adopt policies and procedures to address, and in practice to avoid, engaging in loan practices that may be abusive, unfair, or deceptive – practices that raise legal risks and serious supervisory concerns and that, if not remedied, could result in supervisory action, injury to the bank’s reputation, and financial loss.

    For further information concerning the matters discussed in this advisory letter, please contact the Community and Consumer Law Division at (202) 874-5750, the Compliance Division at (202) 874-4428, or the appropriate supervisory office.

     
     
    David Hammaker
    Deputy Comptroller for Compliance



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    F.T.C. Policy Statement on Unfairness
     

    F.T.C. POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS
    Appended to
    International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949,
    1070 (1984).
    See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).

    FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
    WASHINGTON, D. C. 20580

    December 17, 1980

    The Honorable Wendell H. Ford
    Chairman, Consumer Subcommittee
    Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
    Room 130 Russell Office Building
    Washington, D.C. 20510
     

    The Honorable John C. Danforth
    Ranking Minority Member, Consumer Subcommittee
    Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
    Room 130 Russell Office Building
    Washington, D.C. 20510

     Dear Senators Ford and Danforth:  

    This is in response to your letter of June 13, 1980, concerning one aspect of this agency's jurisdiction over "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." You informed us that the Subcommittee was planning to hold oversight hearings on the concept of "unfairness" as it has been applied to consumer transactions. You further informed us that the views of other interested parties were solicited and compiled in a Committee Print earlier this year.1 Your letter specifically requested the Commission's views on cases under Section 5 "not involving the content of advertising," and its views as to "whether the Commission's authority should be limited to regulating false or deceptive commercial advertising." Our response addresses these and other questions related to the concept of consumer unfairness.


     We are pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the future work of the agency. The subject that you have selected appears to be particularly timely. We recognize that the concept of consumer unfairness is one whose precise meaning is not immediately obvious, and also recognize that this uncertainty has been honestly troublesome for some businesses and some members of the legal profession. This result is understandable in light of the general nature of the statutory standard. At the same time, though, we believe we can respond to legitimate concerns of business and the Bar by attempting to delineate in this letter a concrete framework for future application of the Commission's unfairness authority. We are aided in this process by the cumulative decisions of this agency and the federal courts, which, in our opinion, have brought added clarity to the law. Although the administrative and judicial evolution of the consumer unfairness concept has still left some necessary flexibility in the statute, it is possible to provide a reasonable working sense of the conduct that is covered.
     

    In response to your inquiry we have therefore undertaken a review of the decided cases and rules and have synthesized from them the most important principles of general applicability. Rather than merely reciting the law, we have attempted to provide the Committee with a concrete indication of the manner in which the Commission has enforced, and will continue to enforce, its unfairness mandate. In so doing we intend to address the concerns that have been raised about the meaning of consumer unfairness, and thereby attempt to provide a greater sense of certainty about what the Commission would regard as an unfair act or practice under Section 5.


     This letter thus delineates the Commission's views of the boundaries of its consumer unfairness jurisdiction and is subscribed to by each Commissioner. In addition, we are enclosing a companion Commission statement that discusses the ways in which this body of law differs from, and supplements, the prohibition against consumer deception, and then considers and evaluates some specific criticisms that have been made of our enforcement of the law.2 Since you have indicated a particular interest in the possible application of First Amendment principles to commercial advertising, the companion statement will include discussions relevant to that question. The companion statement is designed to respond to the key questions raised about the unfairness doctrine. However, individual Commissioners may not necessarily endorse particular arguments or particular examples of the Commission's exercise of its unfairness authority contained in the companion statement.
     

    Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of the
    Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction

    Section 5 of the F.T.C. Act prohibits, in part, "unfair ... acts or practices in or affecting commerce."3 This is commonly referred to as the Commission's consumer unfairness jurisdiction. The Commission's jurisdiction over "unfair methods of competition" is not discussed in this letter.4 Although we cannot give an exhaustive treatment of the law of consumer unfairness in this short statement, some relatively concrete conclusions ran nonetheless be drawn.


     The present understanding of the unfairness standard is the result of an evolutionary process. The statute was deliberately framed in general terms since Congress recognized the impossibility of drafting a complete list of unfair trade practices that would not quickly become outdated or leave loopholes for easy evasion.5 The task of identifying unfair trade practices was therefore assigned to the Commission, subject to judicial review,6 in the expectation that the underlying criteria would evolve and develop over time. As the Supreme Court observed as early as 1931, the ban on unfairness "belongs to that class of phrases which do not admit of precise definition, but the meaning and application of which must be arrived at by what this court elsewhere has called 'the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.'"7
     

    By 1964 enough cases had been decided to enable the Commission to identify three factors that it considered when applying the prohibition against consumer unfairness. These were: (1) whether the practice injures consumers; (2) whether it violates established public policy; (3) whether it is unethical or unscrupulous.8 These factors were later quoted with apparent approval by the Supreme Court in the 1972 case of Sperry & Hutchinson.9 Since then the Commission has continued to refine the standard of unfairness in its cases and rules, and it has now reached a more detailed sense of both the definition and the limits of these criteria.10

     

    Consumer injury

    Unjustified consumer injury is the primary focus of the F.T.C. Act, and the most important of the three S&H criteria. By itself it can be sufficient to warrant a finding of unfairness. The Commission's ability to rely on an independent criterion of consumer injury is consistent with the intent of the statute, which was to "[make] the consumer who may be injured by an unfair trade practice of equal concern before the law with the merchant injured by the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor."11


     The independent nature of the consumer injury criterion does not mean that every consumer injury is legally "unfair," however. To justify a finding of unfairness the injury must satisfy three tests. It must be substantial; it must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice produces; and it must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided.
     

    First of all, the injury must be substantial. The Commission is not concerned with trivial or merely speculative harms.12 In most cases a substantial injury involves monetary harm, as when sellers coerce consumers into purchasing unwanted goods or servicesl3 or when consumers buy defective goods or services on credit but are unable to assert against the creditor claims or defenses arising from the transaction. 14 Unwarranted health and safety risks may also support a finding of unfairness.15 Emotional impact and other more subjective types of harm, on the other hand, will not ordinarily make a practice unfair. Thus, for example, the Commission will not seek to ban an advertisement merely because it offends the tastes or social beliefs of some viewers, as has been suggested in some of the comments.16

    Second, the injury must not be outweighed by any offsetting consumer or competitive benefits that the sales practice also produces. Most business practices entail a mixture of economic and other costs and benefits for purchasers. A seller's failure to present complex technical data on his product may lessen a consumer's ability to choose, for example, but may also reduce the initial price he must pay for the article. The Commission is aware of these tradeoffs and will not find that a practice unfairly injures consumers unless it is injurious in its net effects.17 The Commission also takes account of the various costs that a remedy would entail. These include not only the costs to the parties directly before the agency, but also the burdens on society in general in the form of increased paperwork, increased regulatory burdens on the flow of information, reduced incentives to innovation and capital formation, and similar matters.18 Finally, the injury must be one which consumers could not reasonably have avoided.19 Normally we expect the marketplace to be self-correcting, and we rely on consumer choice-the ability of individual consumers to make their own private purchasing decisions without regulatory intervention--to govern the market. We anticipate that consumers will survey the available alternatives, choose those that are most desirable, and avoid those that are inadequate or unsatisfactory. However, it has long been recognized that certain types of sales techniques may prevent consumers from effectively making their own decisions, and that corrective action may then become necessary. Most of the Commission's unfairness matters are brought under these circumstances. They are brought, not to second-guess the wisdom of particular consumer decisions, but rather to halt some form of seller behavior that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to the free exercise of consumer decisionmaking.20

    Sellers may adopt a number of practices that unjustifiably hinder such free market decisions. Some may withhold or fail to generate critical price or performance data, for example, leaving buyers with insufficient information for informed comparisons.21 Some may engage in overt coercion, as by dismantling a home appliance for "inspection" and refusing to reassemble it until a service contract is signed.22 And some may exercise undue influence over highly susceptible classes of purchasers, as by promoting fraudulent "cures" to seriously ill cancer patients.23 Each of these practices undermines an essential precondition to a free and informed consumer transaction, and, in turn, to a well-functioning market. Each of them is therefore properly banned as an unfair practice under the F.T.C. Act.24


     

    Violation of public policy

    The second S&H standard asks whether the conduct violates public policy as it has been established by statute, common law, industry practice, or otherwise. This criterion may be applied in two different ways. It may be used to test the validity and strength of the evidence of consumer injury, or, less often, it may be cited for a dispositive legislative or judicial determination that such injury is present.


     Although public policy was listed by the S&H Court as a separate consideration, it is used most frequently by the Commission as a means of providing additional evidence on the degree of consumer injury caused by specific practices. To be sure, most Commissi6n actions are brought to redress relatively clear-cut injuries, and those determinations are based, in large part, on objective economic analysis. As we have indicated before, the Commission believes that considerable attention should be devoted to the analysis of whether substantial net harm has occurred, not only because that is part of the unfairness test, but also because the focus on injury is the best way to ensure that the Commission acts responsibly and uses its resources wisely. Nonetheless, the Commission wishes to emphasize the importance of examining outside statutory policies and established judicial principles for assistance in helping the agency ascertain whether a particular form of conduct does in fact tend to harm consumers. Thus the agency has referred to First Amendment decisions upholding consumers' rights to receive information, for example, to confirm that restrictions on advertising tend unfairly to hinder the informed exercise of consumer choice.25

    Conversely, statutes or other sources of public policy may affirmatively allow for a practice that the Commission tentatively views as unfair. The existence of such policies will then give the agency reason to reconsider its assessment of whether the practice is actually injurious in its net effects.26 In other situations there may be no clearly established public policies, or the policies may even be in conflict. While that does not necessarily preclude the Commission from taking action if there is strong evidence of net consumer injury, it does underscore the desirability of carefully examining public policies in all instances.27 In any event, whenever objective evidence of consumer injury is difficult to obtain, the need to identify and assess all relevant public policies assumes increased importance.
     

    Sometimes public policy will independently support a Commission action. This occurs when the policy is so clear that it will entirely determine the question of consumer injury, so there is little need for separate analysis by the Commission. In these cases the legislature or court, in announcing the policy, has already determined that such injury does exist and thus it need not be expressly proved in each instance. An example of this approach arose in a case involving a mail-order firm.28 There the Commission was persuaded by an analogy to the due-process clause that it was unfair for the firm to bring collection suits in a forum that was unreasonably difficult for the defendants to reach. In a similar case the Commission applied the statutory policies of the Uniform Commercial Code to require that various automobile manufacturers and their distributors refund to their customers any surplus money that was realized after they repossessed and resold their customer's cars.29 The Commission acts on such a basis only where the public policy is suitable for administrative enforcement by this agency, however. Thus it turned down a petition for a rule to require fuller disclosure of aerosol propellants, reasoning that the subject of fluorocarbon safety was currently under study by other scientific and legislative bodies with more appropriate expertise or jurisdiction over the subject.30

    To the extent that the Commission relies heavily on public policy to support a finding of unfairness, the policy should be clear and well-established. In other words, the policy should be declared or embodied in formal sources such as statutes, judicial decisions, or the Constitution as interpreted by the courts, rather than being ascertained from the general sense of the national values. The policy should likewise be one that is widely shared, and not the isolated decision of a single state or a single court. If these two tests are not met the policy cannot be considered as an "established" public policy for purposes of the S&H criterion. The Commission would then act only on the basis of convincing independent evidence that the practice was distorting the operation of the market and thereby causing unjustified consumer injury.


     

    Unethical or unscrupulous conduct

    Finally, the third S&H standard asks whether the conduct was immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous. This test was presumably included in order to be sure of reaching all the purposes of the underlying statute, which forbids "unfair" acts or practices. It would therefore allow the Commission to reach conduct that violates generally recognized standards of business ethics. The test has proven, however, to be largely duplicative. Conduct that is truly unethical or unscrupulous will almost always injure consumers or violate public policy as well. The Commission has therefore never relied on the third element of S&H as an independent basis for a finding of unfairness, and it will act in the future only on the basis of the first two.

    We hope this letter has given you the information that you require. Please do not hesitate to call if we can be of any further assistance.

    With best regards,


    /s/Michael Pertschuk Chairman
    /s/Paul Rand Dixon Commissioner
    /s/David A. Clanton Commissioner
    /s/Robert Pitofsky Commissioner
    /s/Patricia P. Bailey Commissioner

    __________

    1Unfairness: Views on Unfair Acts and Practices in Violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act (1980) (hereinafter referred to as "Committee Print").

    2Neither this letter nor the companion statement addresses ongoing proceedings, but the Commission is prepared to discuss those matters separately at an appropriate time.

    3The operative sentence of Section 5 reads in full as follows: "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1).

    4In fulfilling its competition or antitrust mission the Commission looks to the purposes, policies, and spirit of the other antitrust laws and the F.T.C. Act to determine whether a practice affecting competition or competitors is unfair. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966). In making this determination the Commission is guided by the extensive legislative histories of those statutes and a considerable body of antitrust case law. The agency's jurisdiction over "deceptive acts or practices" is likewise not discussed in this letter.

    5See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., at 19 (1914) (If Congress "were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless task"). In 1914 the statute was phrased only in terms of "unfair methods of competition," and the reference to "unfair acts or practices" was not added until the Wheeler-Lee Amendment in 1938. The initial language was still understood as reaching most of the conduct now characterized as consumer unfairness, however, and so the original legislative history remains relevant to the construction of that part of the statute.

    6The Supreme Court has stated on many occasions that the definition of "unfairness" is ultimately one for judicial determination. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 249 (1972); F.T.C. v. R..F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934).

    7F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931). See also F.T.C. v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934) ("Neither the language nor the history of the Act suggests that Congress intended to confine the forbidden methods to fixed and unyielding categories").

    8The Commission's actual statement of the criteria was as follows: (1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common- law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).

    Statement of Basis and Purpose, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964).

    9F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson C.., 405 U.S. 223, 244-45 n.5 (1972). The Circuit Courts have concluded that this quotation reflected the Supreme Court's own views. See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 n.8 (7th Cir. 1976); Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 323 (9th Cir. 1974). The application of these factors to antitrust matters is beyond the scope of this letter.

    10These standards for unfairness are generally applicable to both advertising and non-advertising cases.

    1183 Cong. Rec. 3255 (1938) (remarks of Senator Wheeler).

    12An injury may be sufficiently substantial, however, if it does a small harm to a large number of people, or if it raises a significant risk of concrete harm.

    13See, e.g., Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961) (seller's servicemen dismantled home furnaces and then refused to reassemble them until the consumers had agreed to buy services or replacement parts).

    14Statement of Basis and Purpose, Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53522-23 (1975).

    15For an example see Philip Morris, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 16 (1973) (respondent had distributed free-sample razor blades in such a way that they could come into the hands of small children) (consent agreement). Of course, if matters involving health and safety are within the primary jurisdiction of some other agency, Commission action might not be appropriate.

    16See, e.g., comments of Association of National Advertisers, Committee Print at 120. In an extreme case, however, where tangible injury could be clearly demonstrated, emotional effects might possibly be considered as the basis for a finding of unfairness. Cf. 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) (banning, eg., harassing late-night telephone calls).

    17See Pftzer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 62-63 n. 13 (1972); Statement of Basis and Purpose, Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 43 Fed. Reg. 59614, 59636 n.95 (1978).

    When making this determination the Commission may refer to existing public policies for help in ascertaining the existence of consumer injury and the relative weights that should be assigned to various costs and benefits. The role of public policy in unfairness determinations will be discussed more generally below.

    18For example, when the Commission promulgated the Holder Rule it anticipated an overall lowering of economic costs to society because the rule gave creditors the incentive to police sellers, thus increasing the likelihood that those selling defective goods or services would either improve their practices or leave the marketplace when they could not obtain financing. These benefits, in the Commission's judgment, outweighed any costs to creditors and sellers occasioned by the rule. See Statement of Basis and Purpose, Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53522-23 (1975).

    19In some senses any injury can be avoided--for example, by hiring independent experts to test all products in advance, or by private legal actions for damages-but these courses may be too expensive to be practicable for individual consumers to pursue.

    20This emphasis on informed consumer choice has commonly been adopted in other statutes as well. See, e.g., Declaration of Policy, Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. 1451 ("Informed consumers are essential to the fair and efficient functioning of a free market economy".)

    21See, e.g., Statement of Basis and Purpose, Labeling and Advertising of Home Insulation, 44 Fed. Reg. 50218, 50222-23 (1979); Statement of Basis and Purpose, Posting of Minimum Octane Numbers on Gasoline Dispensing Pumps, 36 Fed. Reg. 23871,23882 (1971). See also Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

    22See Holland Furnace Co. v. ETC, 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961); cf Arthur Murray Studio, Inc. v. EW, 458 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972) (emotional high-pressure sales tactics, using teams of salesmen who refused to let the customer leave the room until a contract was signed). See also Statement of Basis and Purpose, Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 37 Fed. Reg. 22934, 22937-38 (1972).

    23See, e.g., Travel King, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 715, 774 (1975). The practices in this rase primarily involved deception, but the Commission noted the special susceptibilities of such patients as one reason for banning the ads entirely rather than relying on the remedy of fuller disclosure. The Commission recognizes that "undue influence" in advertising and promotion is difficult to define, and therefore exercises its authority here only with respect to substantial coercive-like practices and significant consumer injury.

    24These few examples are not exhaustive, but the general direction they illustrate is clear. As the Commission stated in promulgating its Eyeglasses Rule, the inquiry should begin, at least, by asking "whether the acts or practices at issue inhibit the functioning of the competitive market and whether consumers are harmed thereby." Statement of Basis and Purpose, Advertising of 0phthalmic Goods and Services, 43 Fed. Reg. 23992,24001 (1978).

    25See Statement of Basis and Purpose, Advertising of ophthalmic Goods and Services, 43 Fed. Reg. 23992,24001 (1978), citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

    26Cf. Statement of Basis and Purpose, Advertising of ophthalmic Goods and Services, supra; see also n.17 supra.

    27The analysis of external public policies is extremely valuable but not always definitive. The legislative history of Section 5 recognizes that new forms of unfair business practices may arise which, at the time of the Commission's involvement, have not yet been generally proscribed. See page 4, supra. Thus a review of public policies established independently of Commission action may not be conclusive in determining whether the challenged practices should be prohibited or otherwise restricted. At the same time, however, we emphasize the importance of examining public policies, since a thorough analysis can serve as an important check on the overall reasonableness of the Commission's actions.

    28Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976). In this case the Commission did inquire into the extent of the resulting consumer injury, but under the rationale involved it presumably need not have done so. See also F.T.C. v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304 (1934) (firm had gained a marketing advantage by selling goods through a lottery technique that violated state gambling policies); cf. Simeon Management Corp., 87 F.T.C. 1184, 1231 (1976), aff'd, 579 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978) (firm advertised weight-loss program that used a drug which could not itself be advertised under FDA regulations) (alternative ground). Since these public-policy cases are based on legislative determinations, rather than on a judgment within the Commission's area of special economic expertise, it is appropriate that they can reach a relatively wider range of consumer injuries than just those associated with impaired consumer choice.

    29A surplus occurs when a repossessed car is resold for more than the amount owed by the debtor plus the expenses of repossession and resale. The law of 49 states requires that creditors refund surpluses when they occur, but if creditors systematically refuse to honor this obligation, consumers have no practical way to discover that they have been deprived of money to which they are entitled. See Ford Motor Co., 94 F.T.C. 564, 618 (1979) appeal pending, Nos. 79-7649 and 79-7654 (9th Cir.); Ford Motor Co.,93 F.T.C. 402 (1979) (consent decree); General Motors Corp., D. 9074 (Feb., 1980) (consent decree). By these latter two consent agreements the Commission, because of its unfairness jurisdiction, has been able to secure more than $2 million for consumers allegedly deprived of surpluses to which they were entitled.

    30See Letter from John F. Dugan, Acting Secretary, to Action on Smoking and Health (January 13, 1977). See also letter from Charles A. Tobin, Secretary, to Prof. Page and Mr. Young (September 17,1973) (denying petition to exercise § 6(b) subpoena powers to obtain consumer complaint information from cosmetic fu-ms and then to transmit the data to FDA for that agency's enforcement purposes).


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    F.T.C. Policy Statement on Deception
    (Appendix N in 23 Legal Defenses to Foreclosure.)
     

    F.T.C. POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION
    Appended to Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984).

    FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
    WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580

    October 14, 1983

    The Honorable John D. Dingell
    Chairman
    Committee on Energy and Commerce
    U.S. House of Representatives
    Washington, D.C. 20515

    Dear Mr. Chairman:

    This letter responds to the Committee's inquiry regarding the Commission's enforcement policy against deceptive acts or practices.1 We also hope this letter will provide guidance to the public.

    Section 5 of the F.T.C. Act declares unfair or deceptive acts or practices unlawful. Section 12 specifically prohibits false ads likely to induce the purchase of food, drugs, devices or cosmetics. Section 15 defines a false ad for purposes of Section 12 as one which is "misleading in a material respect."2 Numerous Commission and judicial decisions have defined and elaborated on the phrase "deceptive acts or practices" under both Sections 5 and 12. Nowhere, however, is there a single definitive statement of the Commission's view of its authority. The Commission believes that such a statement would be useful to the public, as well as the Committee in its continuing review of our jurisdiction.

    We have therefore reviewed the decided cases to synthesize the most important principles of general applicability. We have attempted to provide a concrete indication of the manner in which the Commission will enforce its deception mandate. In so doing, we intend to address the concerns that have been raised about the meaning of deception, and thereby attempt to provide a greater sense of certainty as to how the concept will be applied.3

    I. SUMMARY

    Certain elements undergird all deception cases. First, there must be a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer.4 Practices that have been found misleading or deceptive in specific cases include false oral or written representations, misleading price claims, sales of hazardous or systematically defective products or services without adequate disclosures, failure to disclose information regarding pyramid sales, use of bait and switch techniques, failure to perform promised services, and failure to meet warranty obligations.5

    Second, we examine the practice from the perspective of a consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances. If the representation or practice affects or is directed primarily to a particular group, the Commission examines reasonableness from the perspective of that group.

    Third, the representation, omission, or practice must be a "material" one. The basic question is whether the act or practice is likely to affect the consumer's conduct or decision with regard to a product or service. If so, the practice is material, and consumer injury is likely, because consumers are likely to have chosen differently but for the deception. In many instances, materiality, and hence injury, can be presumed from the nature of the practice. In other instances, evidence of materiality may be necessary.

    Thus, the Commission will find deception if there is a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment. We discuss each of these elements below.

    II. THERE MUST BE A REPRESENTATION, OMISSION, OR PRACTICE THAT IS LIKELY TO MISLEAD THE CONSUMER.

    Most deception involves written or oral misrepresentations, or omissions of material information. Deception may also occur in other forms of conduct associated with a sales transaction. The entire advertisement, transaction or course of dealing will be considered. The issue is whether the act or practice is likely to mislead, rather than whether it causes actual deceptions.

    Of course, the Commission must find that a representation, omission, or practice occurred in cases of express claims, the representation itself establishes the meaning. In cases of implied claims, the Commission will often be able to determine meaning through an examination of the representation itself, including an evaluation of such factors as the entire document, the juxtaposition of various phrases in the document, the nature of the claim, and the nature of the transactions.7 In other situations, the Commission will require extrinsic evidence that reasonable consumers reach the implied claims.8 In all instances, the Commission will carefully consider any extrinsic evidence that is introduced.

    Some cases involve omission of material information, the disclosure of which is necessary to prevent the claim, practice, or sale from being misleading.9 Information may be omitted from written10 or oral11 representations or from the commercial transaction.12

    In some circumstances, the Commission can presume that consumers are likely to reach false beliefs about the product or service because of an omission. At other times, however, the Commission may require evidence on consumers' expectations.13

    Marketing and point-of-sales practices that are likely to mislead consumers are also deceptive. For instance, in bait and switch cases, a violation occurs when the offer to sell the product is not a bona fide offer.14 The Commission has also found deception where a sales representative misrepresented the purpose of the initial contact with customers.15 When a product is sold, there is an implied representation that the product is fit for the purposes for which it is sold. When it is not, deception occurs.16 There may be a concern about the way a product or service is marketed, such as where inaccurate or incomplete information is provided.17 A failure to perform services promised under a warranty or by contract can also be deceptive.18

    III. THE ACT OR PRACTICE MUST BE CONSIDERED FROM THE
    PERSPECTIVE OF THE REASONABLE CONSUMER

    The Commission believes that to be deceptive the representation, omission or practice must be likely to mislead reasonable consumers under the circumstances.19 The test is whether the consumer's interpretation or reaction is reasonable.20 When representations or sales practices are targeted to a specific audience, the Commission determines the effect of the practice on a reasonable member of that group. In evaluating a particular practice, the Commission considers the totality of the practice in determining how reasonable consumers are likely to respond.

    A company is not liable for every interpretation or action by a consumer. In an advertising context, this principle has been well-stated:

    An advertiser cannot be charged with liability with respect to every conceivable misconception, however outlandish, to which his representations might be subject among the foolish or feeble-minded. Some people, because of ignorance or incomprehension, may be misled by even a scrupulously honest claim. Perhaps a few misguided souls believe, for example, that all "Danish pastry" is made in Denmark. Is it therefore an actionable deception to advertise "Danish pastry" when it is made in this country.? Of course not, A representation does not become "false and deceptive" merely because it will be

    unreasonably misunderstood by an insignificant and unrepresentative segment of the class of persons to whom the representation is addressed. Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963).

    To be considered reasonable, the interpretation or reaction does not have to be the only one.21 When a seller's representation conveys more than one meaning to reasonable consumers, one of which is false, the seller is liable for the misleading interpretation.22 An interpretation will be presumed reasonable if it is the one the respondent intended to convey.

    The Commission has used this standard in its past decisions. The test applied by the Commission is whether the interpretation is reasonable in light of the claim."23 In the Listerine case, the Commission evaluated the claim from the perspective of the "average listener."24 In a case involving the sale of encyclopedias, the Commission observed "[i]n determining the meaning of an advertisement, a piece of promotional material or a sales presentation, the important criterion is the net impression that it is likely to make on the general populace."25 The decisions in American Home Products, Bristol Myers, and Sterling Drug are replete with references to reasonable consumer interpretations.26 In a land sales case, the Commission evaluated the oral statements and written representations "in light of the sophistication and understanding of the persons to whom they were directed."27 Omission cases are no different: the Commission examines the failure to disclose in light of expectations and understandings of the typical buyer28 regarding the claims made.

    When representations or sales practices are targeted to a specific audience, such as children, the elderly, or the terminally ill, the Commission determines the effect of the practice on a reasonable member of that group.29 For instance, if a company markets a cure to the terminally ill, the practice will be evaluated from the perspective of how it affects the ordinary member of that group. Thus, terminally ill consumers might be particularly susceptible to exaggerated cure claims. By the same token, a practice or representation directed to a well-educated group, such as a prescription drug advertisement to doctors, would be judged in light of the knowledge and sophistication of that group.30

    As it has in the past, the Commission will evaluate the entire advertisement, transaction, or course of dealing in determining how reasonable consumers are likely to respond. Thus, in advertising the Commission will examine "the entire mosaic, rather than each tile separately."31 As explained by a court of appeals in a recent case:

    The Commission's right to scrutinize the visual and aural imagery of advertisements follows from the principle that the Commission looks to the impression made by the advertisements as a whole. Without this mode of examination, the Commission would have limited recourse against crafty advertisers whose deceptive messages were conveyed by means other than, or in addition to, spoken words. American Home Products, 695 F.2d 681, 688 (3d Cir. Dec. 3, 1982).32

    In a case involving a weight loss product, the Commission observed:

    It is obvious that dieting is the conventional method of losing weight. But it is equally obvious that many people who need or want to lose weight regard dieting as bitter medicine. To these corpulent consumers the promises of weight loss without dieting are the Siren's call, and advertising that heralds unrestrained consumption while muting the inevitable need for temperance, if not abstinence, simply does not pass muster. Porter & Dietsch, 90 F.T.C. 770, 864-865 (1977), 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980).

    Children have also been the specific target of ads or practices. In Ideal Toy, the Commission adopted the Hearing Examiner's conclusion that:

    False, misleading and deceptive advertising claims beamed at children tend to exploit unfairly a consumer group unqualified by age or experience to anticipate or appreciate the possibility that representations may he exaggerated or untrue. Ideal Toy, 64 F.T.C. 297, 310 (1964).

    See also, Avalon Industries Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1728, 1750 (1974).

    In a subsequent case, the Commission explained that "[i]n evaluating advertising representations, we are required to look at the complete advertisement and formulate our opinions on them on the basis of the net general impression conveyed by them and not on isolated excerpts." Standard Oil of Calif, 84 F.T.C. 1401, 1471 (1974), aff'd as modified, 577 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1978), reissued, 96 F.T.C. 380 (1980).

    The Third Circuit stated succinctly the Commission's standard. "The tendency of the advertising to deceive must be judged by viewing it as a whole, without emphasizing isolated words or phrases apart from their context." Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).

    Commission cases reveal specific guidelines. Depending on the circumstances, accurate information in the text may not remedy a false headline because reasonable consumers may glance only at the headline.33 Written disclosures or fine print may be insufficient to correct a misleading representations.34 Other practices of the company may direct consumers' attention away from the qualifying disclosures.35 Oral statements, label disclosures or point-of-sale material will not necessarily correct a deceptive representation or omission.36 Thus, when the first contact between a seller and a buyer occurs through a deceptive practice, the law may be violated even if the truth is subsequently made known to the purchaser.37 Pro forma statements or disclaimers may not cure otherwise deceptive messages or practices.38

    Qualifying disclosures must be legible and understandable. In evaluating such disclosures, the Commission recognizes that in many circumstances, reasonable consumers do not read the entirety of an ad or are directed away from the importance of the qualifying phrase by the acts or statements of the seller. Disclosures that conform to the Commission's Statement of Enforcement Policy regarding clear and conspicuous disclosures, which applies to television advertising, are generally adequate, CCH Trade Regulation Reporter, ¶ 7569.09 (Oct. 21, 1970). Less elaborate disclosures may also suffice.39

    Certain practices, however, are unlikely to deceive consumers acting reasonably. Thus, the Commission generally will not bring advertising cases based on subjective claims (taste, feel, appearance, smell) or on correctly stated opinion claims if consumers understand the source and limitations of the opinion.40 Claims phrased as opinions are actionable, however, if they are not honestly held, if they misrepresent the qualifications of the holder or the basis of his opinion or if the recipient reasonably interprets them as implied statements of fact.41

    The Commission generally will not pursue cases involving obviously exaggerated or puffing representations, i.e., those that the ordinary consumers do not take seriously.42 Some exaggerated claims, however, may be taken seriously by consumers and are actionable. For instance, in rejecting a respondent's argument that use of the words "electronic miracle" to describe a television antenna was puffery, the Commission stated:

    Although not insensitive to respondent's concern that the term miracle is commonly used in situations short of changing water into wine, we must conclude that the use of "electronic miracle" in the context of respondent's grossly exaggerated claims would lead consumers to give added credence to the overall suggestion that this device is superior to other types of antennae. Jay Norris, 91 F.T.C. 751, 847 n.20 (1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979).

    Finally, as a matter of policy, when consumers can easily evaluate the product or service, it is inexpensive, and it is frequently purchased, the Commission will examine the practice closely before issuing a complaint based on deception. There is little incentive for sellers to misrepresent (either by an explicit false statement or a deliberate false implied statement) in these circumstances since they normally would seek to encourage repeat purchases. Where, as here, market incentives place strong constraints on the likelihood of deception, the Commission will examine a practice closely before proceeding.

    In sum, the Commission will consider many factors in determining the reaction of the ordinary consumer to a claim or practice. As would any trier of fact, the Commission will evaluate the totality of the ad or the practice and ask questions such as: how clear is the representation? how conspicuous is any qualifying information? how important is the omitted information? do other sources for the omitted information exist? how familiar is the public with the product or service?43

    IV. THE REPRESENTATION, OMISSION OR PRACTICE MUST BE MATERIAL

    The third element of deception is materiality. That is, a representation, omission or practice must be a material one for deception to occur.44 A "material" misrepresentation or practice is one which is likely to affect a consumer's choice of or conduct regarding a product.45 In other words, it is information that is important to consumers. If inaccurate or omitted information is material, injury is likely.46

    The Commission considers certain categories of information presumptively material.47 First, the Commission presumes that express claims are material.48 As the Supreme Court stated recently, "[i]n the absence of factors that would distort the decision to advertise, we may assume that the willingness of a business to promote its products reflects a belief that consumers are interested in the advertising."49 Where the seller knew, or should have known, that an ordinary consumer would need omitted information to evaluate the product or service, or that the claim was false, materiality will be presumed because the manufacturer intended the information or omission to have an effect.50 Similarly, when evidence exists that a seller intended to make an implied claim, the Commission will infer materiality.51

    The Commission also considers claims or omissions material if they significantly involve health, safety, or other areas with which the reasonable consumer would be concerned. Depending on the facts, information pertaining to the central characteristics of the product or service will be presumed material. Information has been found material where it concerns the purpose,52 safety,53 efficacy,54 or cost,55 of the product or service. Information is also likely to be material if it concerns durability, performance, warranties or quality. Information pertaining to a finding by another agency regarding the product may also be material.56

    Where the Commission cannot find materiality based on the above analysis, the Commission may require evidence that the claim or omission is likely to be considered important by consumers. This evidence can be the fact that the product or service with the feature represented costs more than an otherwise comparable product without the feature, a reliable survey of consumers, or credible testimony.57

    A finding of materiality is also a finding that injury is likely to exist because of the representation, omission, sales practice, or marketing technique. Injury to consumers can take many forms.58 Injury exists if consumers would have chosen differently but for the deception. If different choices are likely, the claim is material, and injury is likely as well. Thus, injury and materiality are different names for the same concept.

    V. CONCLUSION

    The Commission will find an act or practice deceptive if there is a misrepresentation, omission, or other practice, that misleads the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment. The Commission will not generally require extrinsic evidence concerning the representations understood by reasonable consumers or the materiality of a challenged claim, but in some instances extrinsic evidence will be necessary.

    The Commission intends to enforce the F.T.C. Act vigorously. We will investigate, and prosecute where appropriate, acts or practices that are deceptive. We hope this letter will help provide you and the public with a greater sense of certainty concerning how the Commission will exercise its jurisdiction over deception. Please do not hesitate to call if we can be of any further assistance.

    By direction of the Commission, Commissioners Pertschuk and Bailey dissenting, with separate statements attached and with separate response to the Committee's request for a legal analysis to follow.

    /s/James C. Miller III
    Chairman

    cc: Honorable James T. Broyhill
    Honorable James J. Florio
    Honorable Norman F. Lent


     

    Endnotes:

    1S. Rep. No. 97-451, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16; H.R. Rep. No. 98-156, Part I, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983). The Commission's enforcement policy against unfair acts or practices is set forth in a letter to Senators Ford and Danforth, dated December 17, 1980.

    2In determining whether an ad is misleading, Section 15 requires that the Commission take into account "representations made or suggested" as well as "the extent to which the advertisement fails to reveal facts material in light of such representations or material with respect to consequences which may result from the use of the commodity to which the advertisement relates under the conditions prescribed in said advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary or usual." 15 U.S.C. 55. If an act or practice violates Section 12, it also violates Section 5. Simeon Management Corp., 87 F.T.C. 1184, 1219 (1976), aff'd, 579 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978); Porter & Dietsch, 90 F.T.C. 770, 873-74 (1977), aff'd, 605 P.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980).

    3Chairman Miller has proposed that Section 5 be amended to define deceptive acts. Hearing Before the Subcommittee for Consumers of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. FTCs Authority Over Deceptive Advertising, July 22,1982, Serial No. 97-134, p. 9. Three Commissioners believe a legislative definition is unnecessary. Id. at 45 (Commissioner Clanton), at 51 (Commissioner Bailey) and at 76 (Commissioner Pertschuk). Commissioner Douglas supports a statutory definition of deception. Prepared statement by Commissioner George W. Douglas, Hearing Before the Subcommittee for Consumers of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, United States Senate, 98th Cong. lst Sess. (March 16, 1983) p. 2.

    4A misrepresentation is an express or implied statement contrary to fact. A misleading omission occurs when qualifying information necessary to prevent a practice, claim, representation, or reasonable expectation or belief from being misleading is not disclosed. Not all omissions are deceptive, even if providing the information would benefit consumers. As the Commission noted in rejecting a proposed requirement for nutrition disclosures, "In the final analysis, the question whether an advertisement requires affirmative disclosure would depend on the nature and extent of the nutritional claim made in the advertisement.". ITT Continental Baking Co. Inc., 83 F.T.C. 865, 965 (1976). In determining whether an omission is deceptive, the Commission will examine the overall impression created by a practice, claim, or representation. For example, the practice of offering a product for sale creates an implied representation that it is fit for the purposes for which it is sold. Failure to disclose that the product is not fit constitutes a deceptive omission. [See discussion below at 5-6) Omissions may also be deceptive where the representations made are not literally misleading, if those representations create a reasonable expectation or belief among consumers which is misleading, absent the omitted disclosure.

    Non-deceptive emissions may still violate Section 5 if they are unfair. For instance, the R-Value Rule, 16 C.F.R. 460.5 (1983), establishes a specific method for testing insulation ability, and requires disclosure of the figure in advertising. The Statement of Basis and Purpose, 44 FR 50,242 (1979), refers to a deception theory to support disclosure requirements when certain misleading claims are made, but the rule's general disclosure requirement is based on an unfairness theory. Consumers could not reasonably avoid injury in selecting insulation because no standard method of measurement existed.

    5Advertising that lacks a reasonable basis is also deceptive. Firestone, 81 F.T.C. 398, 451-52 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973). National Dynamics, 82 F.T.C. 488, 549-50 (1973); aff'd and remanded on other grounds, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974), reissued, 85 F.T.C. 391 (1976). National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 191 (1976), aff'd, 570 P.2d 157 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821, reissued, 92 F.T.C. 848 (1978). The deception theory is based on the fact that most ads making objective claims imply, and many expressly state, that an advertiser has certain specific grounds for the claims. If the advertiser does not, the consumer is acting under a false impression. The consumer might have perceived the advertising differently had he or she known the advertiser had no basis for the claim. This letter does not address the nuances of the reasonable basis doctrine, which the Commission is currently reviewing. 48 FR 10,471 (March 11, 1983)

    6In Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976), the court noted "the likelihood or propensity of deception is the criterion by which advertising is measured."

    7On evaluation of the entire document:

    The Commission finds that many of the challenged Anacin advertisements, when viewed in their entirety, did convey the message that the superiority of this product has been proven [footnote omitted]. It is immaterial that the word "established", which was used in the complaint, generally did not appear in the ads; the important consideration is the net impression conveyed to the public. American Home Products, 98 F.T.C. 136, 374 (1981), aff'd, 695 F.2d (3d Cir. 1982).

    On the juxtaposition of phrases:

    On this label, the statement "Kills Germs By Millions On Contact" immediately precedes the assertion "For General Oral Hygiene Bad Breath, Colds and Resultant Sore Throats" [footnote omitted]. By placing these two statements in close proximity, respondent has conveyed the message that since Listerine can kill millions of germs, it can cure, prevent and ameliorate colds and sore throats [footnote omitted]. Warner Lambert, 86F.T.C. 1398, 1489-90 (1975), aff'd, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978) (emphasis in original).

    On the nature of the claim, Firestone is relevant. There the Commission noted that the alleged misrepresentation concerned the safety of respondent's product, "an issue of great significance to consumers. On this issue, the Commission has required scrupulous accuracy in advertising claims, for obvious reasons." 81 F.T.C. 398,456 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. IU2 (1973).

    In each of these cases, other factors, including in some instances surveys, were in evidence on the meaning of the ad.

    8The evidence can consist of expert opinion, consumer testimony (particularly in cases involving oral representations), copy tests, surveys, or any other reliable evidence of consumer interpretation.

    9As the Commission noted in the Cigarette rule, "The nature, appearance, or intended use of a product may create the impression on the mind of the consumer . . . and if the impression is false, and if the seller does not take adequate steps to correct it, he is responsible for an unlawful deception." Cigarette Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, 29 FR 8324, 8352 (July 2, 1964).

    10Porter & Dietsch, 90 F.T.C. 770, 873-74 (1977), aff'd. 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); Simeon Management Corp., 87 F.T.C. 1184, 1230 (1976), aff'd, 579 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978).

    11See, e.g., Grolier, 91 F.T.C. 315,480 (1978), remanded on other grounds, 615 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980), modified on other grounds, 98 FM 882 (1981), reissued, 99 F.T.C. 379 (1982).

    12In Peacock Buick, 86 F.T.C. 1532 (1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1977), the Commission held that absent a clear and early disclosure of the prior use of a late model car, deception can result from the setting in which a sale is made and the expectations of the buyer ... Id at 1555.

    Even in the absence of affirmative misrepresentations, it is misleading for the seller of late model used cars to fail to reveal the particularized uses to which they have been put... When a later model used car is sold at close to list price ... the assumption likely to be made by some purchasers is that, absent disclosure to the contrary, such car has not previously been used in a way that might substantially impair its value. In such circumstances, failure to disclose a disfavored prior use may tend to mislead. Id at 1557-58.

    13In Leonard Porter, the Commission dismissed a complaint alleging that respondents' sale of unmarked products in Alaska led consumers to believe erroneously that they were handmade in Alaska by natives. Complaint counsel had failed to show that consumers of Alaskan craft assumed respondents' products were handmade by Alaskans in Alaska. The Commission was unwilling, absent evidence, to infer from a viewing of the items that the products would tend to mislead consumers.

    By requiring such evidence, we do not imply that elaborate proof of consumer beliefs or behavior is necessary, even in a case such as this, to establish the requisite capacity to deceive. However, where visual inspection is inadequate, some extrinsic testimony evidence must be added. 88 F.T.C. 546, 626, n.5 (1976).

    14Bait and Switch Policy Protocol, December 10, 1975; Guides Against Bait Advertising, 16 C.F.R. 238.0 (1967). 32 PR 15,540.

    15Encyclopedia Britannica 87 F.T.C. 421, 497 (1976), aff'd, 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980), modified, 100 F.T.C. 500 (1982).

    16See the complaints in BayleySuit, C-3117 (consent agreement) (September 30,1983) [102 F.T.C. 1285]; Figgie International, Inc., D. 9166 (May 17, 1983).

    17The Commission's complaints in Chrysler Corporation, 99 F.T.C. 347 (1982), and Volkswagen of America, 99 F.T.C. 446 (1982), alleged the failure to disclose accurate use and care instructions for replacing oil filters was deceptive. The complaint in Ford Motor Co., D. 9154, 96 F.T.C. 362 (1980), charged Ford with failing to disclose a "piston scuffing" defect to purchasers and owners which was allegedly widespread and costly to repair. See also General Motors, D. 9145 (provisionally accepted consent agreement, April 26, 1983). [102 F.T.C. 1741]

    18See Jay Norris Corp., 91 F.T.C. 751 (1978), aff'd with modified language in order, 598 P.2d 1244 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979) (failure to consistently meet guarantee claims of"immediate and prompt" delivery as well as money back guarantees); Southern States Distributing Co., 83 F.T.C. 1126 (1973) (failure to honor oral and written product maintenance guarantees, as represented); Skylark Originals, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 337 (1972), aff'd, 475 F.2d 1396 (3d Cir. 1973) (failure to promptly honor moneyback guarantee as represented in advertisements and catalogs); Capitol Manufacturing Corp., 73 F.T.C. 872 (1968) (failure to fully, satisfactorily and promptly meet all obligations and requirements under terms of service guarantee certificate).

    19The evidence necessary to determine how reasonable consumers understand a representation is discussed in Section II of this letter.

    20An interpretation may be reasonable even though it is not shared by a majority of consumers in the relevant class, or by particularly sophisticated consumers. A material practice that misleads a significant minority of reasonable consumers is deceptive. See Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963).

    21A secondary message understood by reasonable consumers is actionable if deceptive even though the primary message is accurate. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 511 (1980), aff'd 676 F.2d 385, (9th Cir. 1982); Chrysler, 87 F.T.C. 749 (1976), aff'd, 561 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir.), reissued 90 F.T.C. 606 (1977); Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 208 F.2d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 348 U.S. 940 (1955).

    22National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 185 (1976), enforced in part, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977); Jay Norris Corp., 91 F.T.C. 751, 836 (1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir. 1979).

    23National Dynamics, 82 F.T.C. 488, 524, 548 (1973), aff'd, 492 P.2d 1333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974), reissued 85 F.T.C. 39-1 (1976).

    24Warner-Lambert, 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1415 n.4 (1975), aff'd, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).

    25Grolier, 91 F.T.C. 315, 430 (1978), remanded on other grounds, 615 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980), modified on other grounds, 98 F.T.C. 882 (1981), reissued, 99 F.T.C. 379 (1982).

    26American Home Products, 98 F.T.C. 136 (1981), aff'd 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982). consumers may be led to expect, quite reasonably..." (at 386); "... consumers may reasonably believe..." (Id. n.52); "... would reasonably have been understood by consumers...." (at 371); "the record shows that consumers could reasonably have understood this language . . ." (at 372). See also, pp. 373, 374, 375. Bristol-Myers, D. 8917 (July 5, 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-4167 (2nd Cir. Sept. 12,1983)...... ads must be judged by the impression they make on reasonable members of the public . . . " (Slip Op. at 4); ". . . consumers could reasonably have understood . . ." (Slip Op. at 7); ". . . consumers could reasonably infer . . ." (Slip Op. at 11) [ 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983)]. Sterling Drug, Inc., D. 8919 (July 5,1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-7700 (9th Cir. Sept. 14,1983)...... consumers could reasonably assume . . ." (Slip Op. at 9); ". . . consumers could reasonably interpret the ads . . ." (Slip Op. at 33). [102 F.T.C. 395 (1983)]

    27Horizon Corp., 97 F.T.C. 464, 810 n.13 (1981).

    28Simeon Management, 87 F.T.C. 1184, 1230 (1976).

    29The listed categories are merely examples. Whether children, terminally ill patients, or any other subgroup of the population will be considered a special audience depends on the specific factual context of the claim or the practice.

    The Supreme Court has affirmed this approach. "The determination whether an advertisement is misleading requires consideration of the legal sophistication of its audience." Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383 n.37 (1977).

    30In one case, the Commission's complaint focused on seriously ill persons. The ALJ summarized: According to the complaint, the frustrations and hopes of the seriously ill and their families were exploited, and the representation had the tendency and capacity to induce the seriously ill to forego conventional medical treatment worsening their condition and in some cases hastening death, or to cause them to spend large amounts of money and to undergo the inconvenience of traveling for a non-existent "operation." Travel King, 86 F.T.C. 715, 719 (1975).

    31F.T.C. v. Sterling Drug, 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963).

    32Numerous cases exemplify this point. For instance, in Pfizer, the Commission ruled that "the net impression of the advertisement, evaluated from the perspective of the audience to whom the advertisement is directed, is controlling." 81 F.T.C. 23, 58 (1972).

    33In Litton Industries, the Commission held that fine print disclosures that the surveys included only "Litton authorized" agencies were inadequate to remedy the deceptive characterization of the survey population in the headline. 97 F.T.C. 1, 71, n.6 (1981), aff'd as modified, 676 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1982). Compare the Commission's note in the same case that the fine print disclosure "Litton and one other brand" was reasonable to quote the claim that independent service technicians had been surveyed, "[F]ine print was a reasonable medium for disclosing a qualification of only limited relevance." 97 F.T.C. 1, 70, n.5 (1981).

    In another case, the Commission held that the body of the ad corrected the possibly misleading headline because in order to enter the contest, the consumer had to read the text, and the text would eliminate any false impression stemming from the headline. D.L. Blair, 82 F.T.C. 234, 255,256 (1973).

    In one case respondent's expert witness testified that the headline (and accompanying picture) of an ad would be the focal point of the first glance. He also told the administrative law judge that a consumer would spend [t]ypically a few seconds at most" on the ads at issue. Crown Central, 84 F.T.C. 1493, 1543 nn. 14-15 (1974),

    34In Giant Food, the Commission agreed with the examiner that the fine-print disclaimer was inadequate to correct a deceptive impression. The Commission quoted from the examiner's finding that "very few if any of the persons who would read Giant's advertisements would take the trouble to, or did, read the fine print disclaimer." 61 F.T.C. 326, 348 (1962).  Cf. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 P.2d 611, 618 (3d Cir. 1976), where the court reversed the Commission's opinion that no qualifying language could eliminate the deception stemming from use of the slogan "Instant Tax Refund."

    35"Respondents argue that the contracts which consumers signed indicated that credit life insurance was not required for financing, and that this disclosure obviated the possibility of deception. We disagree. It Is clear from consumer testimony that oral deception was employed in some instances to cause consumers to ignore the warning in their sales agreement. . ." Peacock Buick, 86 F.T.C. 1532, 1558-59 (1974).

    36Exposition Press, 295 F.2d $69, 873 (2d Cir. 1961); Gimbel Bros., 61 F.T.C. 1051, 1066 (1962); Carter Products, 186 F.2d 821, 824 (1951).

    By the same token, money-back guarantees do not eliminate deception. In Sears, the Commission observed:  A money-back guarantee is no defense to a charge of deceptive advertising.... A money-back guarantee does not compensate the consumer for the often considerable time and expense incident to returning a major-ticket item and obtaining a replacement.

    Sears, Roebuck and Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 518 (1980), aff'd, 676 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1982). However, the existence of a guarantee, if honored, has a bearing on whether the Commission should exercise its discretion to prosecute. See Deceptive and Unsubstantiated Claims Policy Protocol, 1975.

    37See American Home Products, 98 F.T.C. 136, 370 (1981), aff'd, 695 F.2d 681, 688 (3d Cir. Dec. 3, 1982), Whether a disclosure on the label cures deception in advertising depends on the circumstances:

    ... it is well settled that dishonest advertising is not cured or excused by honest labeling [footnote emitted). Whether the ill-effects of deceptive nondisclosure can be cured by a disclosure requirement limited to labeling, or whether a further requirement of disclosure in advertising should be imposed, is essentially a question of remedy. As such it is a matter within the sound discretion of the Commission [footnote omitted]. The question of whether in a particular case to require disclosure in advertising cannot be answered by application of any hard-and-fast principle. The test is simple and pragmatic: Is it likely that, unless such disclosure is made, a substantial body of consumers will be misled to their detriment? Statement of Basis and Purpose for the Cigarette Advertising and Labeling Trade Regulation Rule, 1965, pp. 89-90. 29 FR 8325 (1964).

    Misleading "door openers" have also been found deceptive (Encyclopedia Britannica, 87 F.T.C. 421 (1976), aff'd, 605 P.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980), as modified, 100 F.T.C. 500 (1982)), as have offers to sell that are not bona fide offers (Seekonk Freezer Meats, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 1025 (1973)). In each of these instances, the truth is made known prior to purchase.

    38In the Listerine case, the Commission held that pro forma statements of no absolute prevention followed by promises of fewer colds did not cure or correct the false message that Listerine will prevent colds. Warner Lambert 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1414 (1975), aff'd, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).

    39Chicago Metropolitan Pontiac Dealers' Ass'n, C. 3110 (June 9,1983). [101 F.T.C. 854 (1983)]

    40An opinion is a representation that expresses only the behalf of the maker, without certainty, as to the existence of a fact, or his judgement as to quality, value, authenticity, or other matters of judgement. American Law Institute, Restatement on Torts, Second ¶ 538 A.

    41Id. ¶ 539. At common law, a consumer can generally rely on an expert opinion. Id., ¶ 542(a). For this reason, representations of expert opinion will generally be regarded as representations of fact.

    42"[T]here is a category of advertising themes, in the nature of puffing or other hyperbole, which do not amount to the type of affirmative product claims for which either the Commission or the consumer would expect documentation." Pfizer, Inc, 81 F.T.C. 23, 64 (1972).

    The term "Puffing" refers generally to an expression of opinion not made as a representation of fact. A seller has some latitude in puffing his goods, but he is not authorized to misrepresent them or to assign to them benefits they do not possess [cite omitted]. Statements made for the purpose of deceiving prospective purchasers cannot properly be characterized as mere puffing. Wilmington Chemical, 69 F.T.C. 828, 865 (1966).

    43In Avalon Industries, the ALJ observed that the "'ordinary person with a common degree of familiarity with industrial civilization' would expect a reasonable relationship between the size of package and the size of quantity of the contents. He would have no reason to anticipate slack filling." 83 F.T.C. 1728, 1750 (1974) (I.D.).

    44"A misleading claim or omission in advertising will violate Section 5 or Section 12, however, only if the omitted information would be a material factor in the consumer's decision to purchase the product." American Home Products Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136,368 (1981), aff'd, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982). A claim is material if it is likely to affect consumer behavior. "Is it likely to affect the average consumer in deciding whether to purchase the advertised product-is there a material deception, in other words?" Statement of Basis and Purpose, Cigarette Advertising and Labeling Rule, 1965, pp. 86-87. 29 FR 8325 (1964).

    45Material information may affect conduct other than the decision to purchase a product. The Commission's complaint in Volkswagen of America, 99 F.T.C. 446 (1982), for example, was based on provision of inaccurate instructions for oil filter installation. In its Restatement on Torts, Second, the American Law Institute defines a material misrepresentation or omission as one which the reasonable person would regard as important in deciding how to act, or one which the maker knows that the recipient, because of his or her own peculiarities, is likely to consider important. Section 538(2). The Restatement explains that a material fact does not necessarily have to affect the finances of a transaction. "There are many more-or-less sentimental considerations that the ordinary man regards as important." Comment on Clause 2(a)(d).

    46In evaluating materiality, the Commission takes consumer preferences as given. Thus, if consumers prefer one product to another, the Commission need not determine whether that preference is objectively justified. See Algoma Lumber, 291 U.S. 54, 78 (1933). Similarly, objective differences among products are not material if the difference is not likely to affect consumer choices.

    47The Commission will always consider relevant and competent evidence offered to rebut presumptions of materiality.

    48Because this presumption is absent for some implied claims, the Commission will take special caution to ensure materiality exists in such cases.

    49Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557, 567 (1980).

    50Cf. Restatement on Contracts, Second ¶ 162(l).

    51In American Home Products, the evidence was that the company intended to differentiate its products from aspirin. The very fact that AHP sought to distinguish its products from aspirin strongly implies that knowledge of the true ingredients of those products would be material to purchasers." American Home Products, 98 F.T.C. 136, 368 (1981), aff'd, 695 F.2d 681 (3d. Cir. 1982).

    52In Fedders, the ads represented that only Fedders gave the assurance of cooling on extra hot, humid days. "Such a representation is the raison d'etre for an air conditioning unit-it is an extremely material representation." 85 F.T.C. 38, 61 (1975) (I.D.), petition dismissed, 529 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976).

    53"We note at the outset that both alleged misrepresentations go to the issue of the safety of respondent's product, an issue of great significance to consumers." Firestone, 81 F.T.C. 398, 456 (1972), aff'd, 481 P.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).

    54The Commission found that information that a product was effective in only the small minority of cases where tiredness symptoms are due to an iron deficiency, and that it was of no benefit in all other cases, was material. J.B. Williams Co., 68 F.T.C. 481, 546 (1965), aff'd, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).

    55As the Commission noted in MacMillan, Inc.:

    In marketing their courses, respondents failed to adequately disclose the number of lesson assignments to be submitted in a course. These were material facts necessary for the student to calculate his tuition obligation, which was based on the number of lesson assignments he submitted for grading. The nondisclosure of these material facts combined with the confusion arising from LaSalle's inconsistent use of terminology had the capacity to mislead students about the nature and extent of their tuition obligation. MacMillan, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 208, 303-304 (1980).  See also, Peacock Buick, 86 F.T.C. 1532, 1562 (1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1977).

    56Simeon Management Corp., 87 F.T.C. 1184 (1976), aff'd, 579 P.2d 1137, 1168, n.10 (9th Cir. 1978).

    57In American Home Products, the Commission approved the ALJ's finding of materiality from an economic perspective:

    If the record contained evidence of a significant disparity between the prices of Anacin and plain aspirin, it would form a further basis for a finding of materiality. That is, there is a reason to believe consumers are willing to pay a premium for a product believed to contain a special analgesic ingredient but not for a product whose analgesic is ordinary aspirin. American Home Products, 98 F.T.C. 136, 369 (1981), aff'd, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982).

    58The prohibitions of Section 5 are intended to prevent injury to competitors as well as to consumers. The Commission regards injury to competitors as identical to injury to consumers. Advertising and legitimate marketing techniques are intended to "lure" competitors by directing business to the advertiser. In fact, vigorous competitive advertising can actually benefit consumers by lowering prices, encouraging product innovation, and increasing the specificity and amount of information available to consumers. Deceptive practices injure both competitors and consumers because consumers who preferred the competitor's product are wrongly diverted.


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    Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
    (Appendix Q in 23 Legal Defenses to Foreclosure.)
     

    THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

    As amended by Pub. L. 109-351, §§ 801-02, 120 Stat. 1966 (2006)

    As a public service, the staff of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has prepared the following complete text of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p.

    Please note that the format of the text differs in minor ways from the U.S. Code and West’s U.S. Code Annotated. For example, this version uses FDCPA section numbers in the headings. In addition, the relevant U.S. Code citation is included with each section heading. Although the staff has made every effort to transcribe the statutory material accurately, this compendium is intended as a convenience for the public and not a substitute for the text in the U.S. Code.

    Table of Contents

    § 801 Short title

    § 802 Congressional findings and declaration of purpose

    § 803 Definitions

    § 804 Acquisition of location information

    § 805 Communication in connection with debt collection

    § 806 Harassment or abuse

    § 807 False or misleading representations

    § 808 Unfair practices

    § 809 Validation of debts

    § 810 Multiple debts

    § 811 Legal actions by debt collectors

    § 812 Furnishing certain deceptive forms

    § 813 Civil liability

    § 814 Administrative enforcement

    § 815 Reports to Congress by the Commission

    § 816 Relation to State laws

    § 817 Exemption for State regulation

    § 818 Exception for certain bad check enforcement programs operated by

    private entities

    § 819 Effective date

    15 USC 1601 note

    § 801. Short Title

    This title may be cited as the “Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.”

    § 802. Congressional findings and declaration of purpose

    (a) There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.

    (b) Existing laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers.

    (c) Means other than misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection practices are available for the effective collection of debts.

    (d) Abusive debt collection practices are carried on to a substantial extent in interstate commerce and through means and instrumentalities of such commerce. Even where abusive debt collection practices are purely intrastate in character, they nevertheless directly affect interstate commerce.

    (e) It is the purpose of this title to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.

    15 USC 1692a

    § 803. Definitions

    As used in this title—

    (1) The term “Commission” means the Federal Trade Commission.

    (2) The term “communication” means the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.

    (3) The term “consumer” means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.

     (4) The term “creditor” means any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term does not include any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.

    (5) The term “debt” means any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of

    a transaction in which the money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.

    (6) The term “debt collector” means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. Notwithstanding the exclusion provided by clause (F) of the last sentence of this paragraph, the term includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. For the purpose of section 808(6), such term also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests. The term does not include—

    (A) any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such

    creditor;

    (B) any person while acting as a debt collector for another person, both of whom are related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if the person acting as a debt collector does so only for persons to whom it is so related or affiliated and if the principal business of such person is not the collection of debts;

    (C) any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties;

    (D) any person while serving or attempting to serve legal process on any other person in connection with the judicial enforcement of any debt;

    (E) any nonprofit organization which, at the request of consumers, performs bona fide consumer credit counseling and assists consumers in the liquidation of their debts by receiving payments from such consumers and distributing such amounts to creditors; and

    (F) any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due

    another to the extent such activity

    (i) is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide escrow arrangement;

    (ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person;

    (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person; or

    (iv) concerns a debt obtained by such person as a secured party in a commercial credit transaction involving the creditor.

    (7) The term “location information” means a consumer’s place of abode and his telephone number at such place,

    or his place of employment.

    (8) The term “State” means any State, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the

    Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing.

    § 804 15 USC 1692b

    § 804. Acquisition of location information

    Any debt collector communicating with any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer shall—

    (1) identify himself, state that he is confirming or correcting location information concerning the consumer, and,

    only if expressly requested, identify his employer;

    (2) not state that such consumer owes any debt;

    (3) not communicate with any such person more than once unless requested to do so by such person or unless the debt collector reasonably believes that the earlier response of such person is erroneous or incomplete and that such person now has correct or complete location information;

    (4) not communicate by post card;

    (5) not use any language or symbol on any envelope or in the contents of any communication effected by the mails or telegram that indicates that the debt collector is in the debt collection business or that the communication relates to the collection of a debt; and

    (6) after the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with regard to the subject debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address, not communicate with any person other than that attorney, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to the communication from the debt collector.

    § 805 15 USC 1692c

    § 805. Communication in connection with debt collection

    (a) COMMUNICATION WITH THE CONSUMER GENERALLY. Without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt—

    (1) at any unusual time or place or a time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer. In the absence of knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, a debt collector shall assume that the convenient time for communicating with a consumer is after 8 o’clock antimeridian and before 9 o’clock postmeridian, local time at the consumer’s location;

    (2) if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to a communication from the debt collector or unless the attorney consents to direct communication with the consumer; or

    (3) at the consumer’s place of employment if the debt collector knows or has reason to know that the consumer’s employer prohibits the consumer from receiving such communication.

    (b) COMMUNICATION WITH THIRD PARTIES. Except as provided in section 804, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a post judgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than a consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.

    (c) CEASING COMMUNICATION. If a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt, except—

    (1) to advise the consumer that the debt collector’s further efforts are being terminated;

    (2) to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or creditor; or

    (3) where applicable, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor intends to invoke a specified remedy. If such notice from the consumer is made by mail, notification shall be complete upon receipt.

    (d) For the purpose of this section, the term “consumer” includes the consumer’s spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator.

    15 USC 1692d

    § 806. Harassment or abuse

    A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

    (1) The use or threat of use of violence or other criminal means to harm the physical person, reputation, or property of any person.

    (2) The use of obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader.

    (3) The publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts, except to a consumer reporting agency or to persons meeting the requirements of section 603(f) or 604(3) of this Act.

    (4) The advertisement for sale of any debt to coerce payment of the debt.

    (5) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.

    (6) Except as provided in section 804, the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.

    15 USC 1692e

    § 807. False or misleading representations

    A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

    (1) The false representation or implication that the debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United States or any State, including the use of any badge, uniform, or facsimile thereof.

    (2) The false representation of—

    (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or

    (B) any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.

    (3) The false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney.

    (4) The representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in the arrest or imprisonment of any person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages of any person unless such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor intends to take such action.

    (5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.

    (6) The false representation or implication that a sale, referral, or other transfer of any interest in a debt shall cause the consumer to—

    (A) lose any claim or defense to payment of the debt; or

    (B) become subject to any practice prohibited by this title.

    (7) The false representation or implication that the consumer committed any crime or other conduct in order to disgrace the consumer.

     (8) Communicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.

    (9) The use or distribution of any written communication which simulates or is falsely represented to be a document authorized, issued, or approved by any court, official, or agency of the United States or any State, or which creates a false impression as to its source, authorization, or approval.

    (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.

    (11) The failure to disclose in the initial written communication with the consumer and, in addition, if the initial communication with the consumer is oral, in that initial oral communication, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, and the failure to disclose in subsequent communications that the communication is from a debt collector, except that this paragraph shall

    not apply to a formal pleading made in connection with a legal action.

    (12) The false representation or implication that accounts have been turned over to innocent purchasers for value.

    (13) The false representation or implication that documents are legal process.

    (14) The use of any business, company, or organization name other than the true name of the debt collector’s business, company, or organization.

    (15) The false representation or implication that documents are not legal process forms or do not require action by the consumer.

    (16) The false representation or implication that a debt collector operates or is employed by a consumer reporting agency as defined by section 603(f) of this Act.

    15 USC 1692f

    § 808. Unfair practices

    A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. Without  limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: (1) The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation)

    unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.

    (2) The acceptance by a debt collector from any person of a check or other payment instrument postdated by more than five days unless such person is notified in writing of the debt collector’s intent to deposit such check or instrument not more than ten nor less than three business days prior to such deposit.

    (3) The solicitation by a debt collector of any postdated check or other postdated payment instrument for the purpose of threatening or instituting criminal prosecution.

    (4) Depositing or threatening to deposit any postdated check or other postdated payment instrument prior to the date on such check or instrument.

    (5) Causing charges to be made to any person for communications by concealment of the true propose of the communication. Such charges include, but are not limited to, collect telephone calls and telegram fees.

    (6) Taking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if—

    (A) there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest;

    (B) there is no present intention to take possession of the property; or

    (C) the property is exempt by law from such dispossession or disablement.

     (7) Communicating with a consumer regarding a debt by post card.

    (8) Using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or by telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name if such name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business.

    15 USC 1692G

    § 809. Validation of debts

    (a) Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing—

    (1) the amount of the debt;

    (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;

    (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;

    (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and

    (5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

    (b) If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or any copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. Collection activities and communications that do not otherwise violate this title may continue during the 30-day period referred to in subsection (a) unless the consumer has notified the debt collector in writing that the debt, or any portion of the debt, is disputed or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor.  Any collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor.

    (c) The failure of a consumer to dispute the validity of a debt under this section may not be construed by any court as an admission of liability by the consumer.

    (d) A communication in the form of a formal pleading in a civil action shall not be treated as an initial communication for purposes of subsection (a).

    (e) The sending or delivery of any form or notice which does not relate to the collection of a debt and is expressly required by the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, title V of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, or any provision of Federal or State law relating to notice of data security breach or privacy, or any regulation prescribed under any such provision of law, shall not be treated as an initial communication in connection with debt collection for purposes of this section.

    15 USC 1692h

    § 810. Multiple debts

    If any consumer owes multiple debts and makes any single payment to any debt collector with respect to such debts, such debt collector may not apply such payment to any debt which is disputed by the consumer and, where applicable, shall apply

    such payment in accordance with the consumer’s directions.

    15 USC 1692i

    § 811. Legal actions by debt collectors

    (a) Any debt collector who brings any legal action on a debt against any consumer shall—

    (1) in the case of an action to enforce an interest in real property securing the consumer’s obligation, bring such action only in a judicial district or similar legal entity in which such real property is located; or

    (2) in the case of an action not described in paragraph (1), bring such action only in the judicial district or similar

    legal entity—

    (A) in which such consumer signed the contract sued upon; or

    (B) in which such consumer resides at the commencement of the action.

    (b) Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize the bringing of legal actions by debt collectors.

    15 USC 1692j

    § 812. Furnishing certain deceptive forms

    (a) It is unlawful to design, compile, and furnish any form knowing that such form would be used to create the false belief in a consumer that a person other than the creditor of such consumer is participating in the collection of or in an attempt to collect a debt such consumer allegedly owes such creditor, when in fact such person is not so participating.

    (b) Any person who violates this section shall be liable to the same extent and in the same manner as a debt collector is liable under section 813 for failure to comply with a provision of this title.

    15 USC 1692k

    § 813. Civil liability

    (a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this title with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of—

    (1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such failure;

    (2) (A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000; or

    (B) in the case of a class action,

    (i) such amount for each named plaintiff as could be recovered under subparagraph (A), and

    (ii) such amount as the court may allow for all other class members, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector; and

    (3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court. On a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs.

    (b) In determining the amount of liability in any action under subsection (a), the court shall consider, among other relevant factors—

    (1) in any individual action under subsection (a)(2)(A), the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional; or

    (2) in any class action under subsection (a)(2)(B), the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, the resources of the debt collector, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the debt collector’s noncompliance was intentional.

     (c) A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this title if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.

    (d) An action to enforce any liability created by this title may be brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.

    (e) No provision of this section imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any advisory opinion of the Commission, notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, such opinion is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.

    15 USC 1692l

    § 814. Administrative enforcement

    (a) Compliance with this title shall be enforced by the Commission, except to the extent that enforcement of the requirements imposed under this title is specifically committed to another agency under subsection (b). For purpose of the exercise by the Commission of its functions and powers under the Federal Trade Commission Act, a violation

    of this title shall be deemed an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of that Act. All of the functions and powers of the Commission under the Federal Trade Commission Act are available to the Commission to enforce compliance by any person with this title, irrespective of whether that person is engaged in commerce or meets any other jurisdictional tests in the Federal Trade Commission Act, including the power to enforce the provisions of this title in the same manner as if the violation had been a violation of a Federal Trade Commission trade regulation rule.

    (b) Compliance with any requirements imposed under this title shall be enforced under—

     (1) section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, in the case of—

    (A) national banks, by the Comptroller of the Currency;

    (B) member banks of the Federal Reserve System (other than national banks), by the Federal Reserve Board; and

    (C) banks the deposits or accounts of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (other than members of the Federal Reserve System), by the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;

    (2) section 5(d) of the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, section 407 of the National Housing Act, and sections 6(i) and 17 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (acting directing or through the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation), in the case of any institution subject to any of those provisions;

    (3) the Federal Credit Union Act, by the Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration with respect to any Federal credit union;

    (4) subtitle IV of Title 49, by the Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to any common carrier subject to such subtitle;

    (5) the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, by the Secretary of Transportation with respect to any air carrier or any foreign air carrier subject to that Act; and

    (6) the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921 (except as provided in section 406 of that Act), by the Secretary of Agriculture with respect to any activities subject to that Act.

    (c) For the purpose of the exercise by any agency referred to in subsection (b) of its powers under any Act referred to in that subsection, a violation of any requirement imposed under this title shall be deemed to be a violation of a requirement imposed under that Act. In addition to its powers under any provision of law specifically referred to in subsection (b), each of the agencies referred to in that subsection may exercise, for the purpose of enforcing compliance with any requirement imposed under this title any other authority conferred on it by law, except as provided in subsection (d).

    (d) Neither the Commission nor any other agency referred to in subsection (b) may promulgate trade regulation rules or other regulations with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors as defined in this title.

    15 USC 1692m

    § 815. Reports to Congress by the Commission

    (a) Not later than one year after the effective date of this title and at one-year intervals thereafter, the Commission  shall make reports to the Congress concerning the administration of its functions under this title, including such recommendations as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate. In addition, each report of the Commission shall include its assessment of the extent to which compliance with this title is being achieved and a summary of the enforcement actions taken by the Commission under section 814 of this title.

    (b) In the exercise of its functions under this title, the Commission may obtain upon request the views of any other Federal agency which exercises enforcement functions under section 814 of this title.

    15 USC 1692n

    § 816. Relation to State laws

    This title does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this title from complying with the laws of any State with respect to debt collection practices, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this title, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency. For purposes of this section, a State law is not inconsistent with this title if the protection such law affords any consumer is greater than the protection provided by this title.

    15 USC 1692o

    § 817. Exemption for State regulation

    The Commission shall by regulation exempt from the requirements of this title any class of debt collection practices within any State if the Commission determines that under the law of that State that class of debt collection practices is subject to requirements substantially similar to those imposed by this title, and that there is adequate provision for enforcement.

    15 USC 1692p

    § 818. Exception for certain bad check enforcement programs operated by private entities

    (a) In General.—

    (1) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PRIVATE ENTITIES.—

    Subject to paragraph (2), a private entity shall be excluded from the definition of a debt collector, pursuant to the exception provided in section 803(6), with respect to the operation by the entity of a program described in paragraph (2)(A) under a contract described in paragraph (2)(B).

    (2) CONDITIONS OF APPLICABILITY.—Paragraph (1) shall apply if—

    (A) a State or district attorney establishes, within the jurisdiction of such State or district attorney and with respect to alleged bad check violations that do not involve a check described in subsection (b), a pretrial diversion program for alleged bad check offenders who agree to participate voluntarily in such program to avoid criminal prosecution;

    (B) a private entity, that is subject to an administrative support services contract with a State or district attorney and operates under the direction, supervision, and control of such State or district attorney, operates the pretrial diversion program described in subparagraph (A); and

    (C) in the course of performing duties delegated to it by a State or district attorney under the contract, the private entity referred to in subparagraph (B)—

    (i) complies with the penal laws of the State;

    (ii) conforms with the terms of the contract and directives of the State or district attorney;

    (iii) does not exercise independent prosecutorial discretion;

    (iv) contacts any alleged offender referred to in subparagraph (A) for purposes of participating in a program referred to in such paragraph—

    (I) only as a result of any determination by the State or district attorney that probable cause of a bad check violation under State penal law exists, and that contact with the alleged offender for purposes of participation in the program is appropriate; and

    (II) the alleged offender has failed to pay the bad check after demand for payment, pursuant to State law, is made for payment of the check amount;

    (v) includes as part of an initial written communication with an alleged offender a clear and conspicuous statement that—

    (I) the alleged offender may dispute the validity of any alleged bad check violation;

    (II) where the alleged offender knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, that the alleged bad check violation is the result of theft or forgery of the check, identity theft, or other fraud that is not the result of the conduct of the alleged offender, the alleged offender may file a crime report with the appropriate law enforcement agency; and

    (III) if the alleged offender notifies the private entity or the district attorney in writing, not later than 30 days after being contacted for the first time pursuant to clause (iv), that there is a dispute pursuant to this subsection, before further restitution efforts are pursued, the district attorney or an employee of the district attorney authorized to make such a determination makes a determination that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed; and

    (vi) charges only fees in connection with services under the contract that have been authorized by the contract with the State or district attorney.

    (b) Certain Checks Excluded.—A check is described in this subsection if the check involves, or is subsequently found to involve—

    (1) a postdated check presented in connection with a payday loan, or other similar transaction, where the payee of the check knew that the issuer had insufficient funds at the time the check was made, drawn, or delivered;

    (2) a stop payment order where the issuer acted in good faith and with reasonable cause in stopping payment on the check;

    (3) a check dishonored because of an adjustment to the issuer’s account by the financial institution holding such account without providing notice to the person at the time the check was made, drawn, or delivered;

    (4) a check for partial payment of a debt where the payee had previously accepted partial payment for such debt;

    (5) a check issued by a person who was not competent, or was not of legal age, to enter into a legal contractual obligation at the time the check was made, drawn, or delivered; or

    (6) a check issued to pay an obligation arising from a transaction that was illegal in the jurisdiction of the State or district attorney at the time the check was made, drawn, or delivered.

    (c) Definitions.—For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply:

     (1) STATE OR DISTRICT ATTORNEY.—The term “State or district attorney” means the chief elected or appointed prosecuting attorney in a district, county (as defined in section 2 of title 1, United States Code), municipality, or comparable jurisdiction, including State attorneys general who act as chief elected or appointed prosecuting attorneys in a district, county (as so defined), municipality or comparable jurisdiction, who may be referred to by a variety of titles such as district attorneys, prosecuting attorneys, commonwealth’s attorneys, solicitors, county attorneys, and state’s attorneys, and who are responsible for the prosecution of State crimes and violations of jurisdiction-specific local ordinances.

    (2) CHECK.—The term “check” has the same meaning as in section 3(6) of the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act.

    (3) BAD CHECK VIOLATION.—The term “bad check violation” means a violation of the applicable State criminal law relating to the writing of dishonored checks.

    15 USC 1692r

    § 819. Effective date

    This title takes effect upon the expiration of six months after the date of its enactment, but section 809 shall apply only with respect to debts for which the initial attempt to collect occurs after such effective date.

     

    15 USC 1692 note

    Legislative History

    House Report: No. 95-131 (Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs)

    Senate Report: No. 95-382 (Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs)

    Congressional Record, Vol. 123 (1977)

    April 4, House considered and passed H.R. 5294.

    Aug. 5, Senate considered and passed amended version of H.R. 5294.

    Sept. 8, House considered and passed Senate version.

    Enactment: Public Law 95-109 (Sept. 20, 1977)

    Amendments: Public Law Nos.

    99-361 (July 9, 1986)

    104-208 (Sept. 30, 1996)

    109-351 (Oct. 13, 2006)




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